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OF GIFT HORSES AND GREAT EXPECTATIONS:
REMANDS WITHOUT VACATUR IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW *
Daniel B. Rodriguez +

I. INTRODUCTION
Administrative law has been shaped over the years by fundamentally practical considerations.
In the early days of the so-called "administrative state," these considerations pointed to a cautious
involvement of courts in the processes of curtailing especially egregious regulatory decisions.1
Displacement of agency decisions by courts was rare; yet, the omnipresent threat of substantial judicial
intrusion surely affected agency decisions. The adoption of the APA in 1946 reflected, as well, practical
concerns.2 Though this statute provides a comprehensive template for federal agency decisionmaking,
what is striking about the APA is how much is left out and how much is left to the discretion of both
agencies in implementing regulatory decisions and to the courts in superintending agency action.
Moreover, many note that the nearly sixty-year-old APA is anachronistic, given the contemporary
nature and scope of regulatory issues.3 However legalistic are the contours of traditional and
contemporary administrative law, there is a deep concern with practical judgment,4 a concern rooted in
our faith in this rather modern, and hard constitutionally to categorize, tradition of policymaking by
administrative agencies.5
Given this history, it is hardly surprising that many doctrinal techniques represent the pragmatic

*

Prepared for "Remands" Conference, Arizona State Law Journal, Arizona State
University College of Law, Tempe, AZ, February 13, 2004.
+

Dean and Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law.

1

See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Interstate Commerce
Comm'n v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 222 U.S. 541 (1912).
2

See generally Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447 (1986).

3

See, e.g., Edward Rubin, It's Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act
Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 97 (2003) ("The statute fails to recognize the new modes of
governance that characterize the administrative state, such as priority setting, resource allocation,
research, planning, targeting, guidance, and strategic enforcement.").
4

See, e.g., R. Shep Melnick, Administrative Law and Bureaucratic Reality, 44 ADMIN .
L. REV. 245 (1992).
5

For a wide-ranging, fascinating discussion of the fundamental tensions between traditional
democratic debates about the "legitimacy" of the administrative state and more contemporary,
theoretically informed understandings, see Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 711 (2001).
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effort of courts to shape agency decisionmaking through deliberate use of doctrine. One excellent
example of this effort is the device of remand without vacatur. Remand without vacatur is a mechanism
by which courts remand back to an agency a decision in circumstances in which the court believes the
agency rationale is flawed, yet declines to vacate the agency decision.6 Thus, the agency decision
stands during the period in which the agency scrambles to develop a rationale for the rule that will
survive judicial scrutiny. The court retains all the power it has to vacate the rule eventually; however, it
holds its fire while the agency goes back to the drawing board.
Leading administrative law scholars have embraced this device as an eminently practical
compromise wrought by the federal courts.7 They argue that the remand without vacatur devices strike
the right balance between aggressive review and administrative discretion. It is, in Ron Levin's words,
"an expression of judicial humility."8 Moreover, it is just what the doctor ordered for a regulatory world
in which administrative rulemaking has become "ossified."9
My claim in this essay, however, is that this view misconstrues the complex relationship
between courts and agencies. While the remand without vacatur device appears to limit the scope of
judicial scrutiny, the conclusion that it results in an optimal state of the world in which judicial review is
neither too hot, nor too cold, but just right, is naïve. Remand without vacatur does not exist in an
administrative law vacuum. Courts carry out their role as judicial police officers in the shadow of the
remedial strategies that are available to them as they conduct their activities. Where a certain remedy is
unavailable, the court must adapt its judicial strategy accordingly. Judicial remedies are not exogenous,
but endogenous; that is, courts can and do consider which techniques are best suited to their objectives
of superintending the process of regulatory decisionmaking.10
In the broadest terms, administrative law reflects the rules by which courts regulate, in particular
ways and for particular reasons, agency decisions. Thus, remand without vacatur does not spring up out
of nowhere as an effort to curtail judicial power. Rather, courts use this strategy in order to temper the
6

See, e.g., Milk Train, Inc. v. Veneman, 310 F.3d 747, 755-56 (D.C. Cir. 2002);
Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1994). For a good general discussion, see Brian S.
Prestes, Remanding Without Vacating Agency Action, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 108 (2001), and sources
cited in infra note 82.
7

See Ronald M. Levin, 'Vacation' at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion
in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 6-10, on file with author);
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 75-78
(1995).
8

Levin, supra note 7 (manuscript at 57).

9

See Pierce, supra note 7, at 60; see also William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited:
Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve
Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 393 (2000); Thomas O.
McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385-86
(1992).
10

See Joseph L. Smith & Emerson H. Tiller, The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from
Administrative Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD . 61, 61-67 (2002).
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draconian impact of hard look review. In using this technique, hard look review goes down easier;
aggressive judicial review is ameliorated in its effects by the remand without vacatur device. If this
characterization is right, the real question we ought to be asking in considering the impact of the remand
without vacatur device is not whether it is a good strategy in light of hard look review, but, instead,
whether its use contributes to an equilibrium in which hard look review is made more palatable.11
The judicially created strategy of remand without vacatur should be disfavored precisely
because it facilitates the use of more aggressive judicial scrutiny of agencies' reasoning process. The
rationale offered by leading commentators for the device is that it promotes agency flexibility--this is the
heart of the argument, that it reduces agency ossification. My argument, however, is that it may do quite
the opposite. By adding to the flexibility of judicial review, it promotes judicial activism. It does so,
more specifically, by empowering the courts to intervene, rather than hold back, in the agency
decisionmaking process. While it is fair to suggest that agencies may prefer remand without vacatur to
the more apocalyptic step of simple vacatur, the choice between the two is truly an illusive one. What
we want to know is how this practical strategy interacts with the central issue of judicial intervention.
In this essay, I first examine some of the underpinnings of the objections to expansive judicial
review of agency rulemaking. The burden of this essay, I hasten to add, is not to provide new reasons
for or against the claim that rulemaking has become ossified because of aggressive judicial review. That
spirited debate is the subject of a plethora of fine articles,12 not to mention arguments within influential
appellate courts.13 Rather, the purpose of the discussion of agency rulemaking and judicial review is to
frame the basic argument of this essay, that is, that judicial devices like remand without vacatur have the
paradoxical effect of encouraging more interventionist judicial review.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. Regulatory Decisionmaking and the Hard Look
Since the 1970s, federal courts have given agency decisions a "hard look" to ensure that
agencies have acted reasonably, have considered all relevant issues, and have based their decisions
upon evidence and facts, not merely conjecture and politics.14 Hard look review was born of a distrust
11

The discussion of "endogeneity" and "equilibrium" in these two paragraphs references a
large, recent body of literature involving "positive political theory" perspectives on administrative
processes and the regulatory state. See generally Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political
Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72 WASH . U. L.Q. 1 (1994); Matthew D. McCubbins et al.,
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control
of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989).
12

See sources cited supra note 9 and infra note 42.

13

See sources cited infra notes 14, 17 & 27.

14

See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977); Home Box Office,
Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Greater
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of agency performance and a confidence in the ability of courts to separate well-reasoned decisions
from poorly-reasoned agency decisions.15 Searching review, it was believed by the architects of the
hard look strategy, protects the public against irrational and unfounded agency decisions.16 In his
concurring opinion in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,17 Judge Harold Leventhal expressed well the structure of
hard look review in the ordinary administrative law case:
Once the presumption of regularity in agency action is challenged with a factual
submission, and even to determine whether such a challenge has been made, the
agency's record and reasoning has to be looked at. If there is some factual support for
the challenge, there must be either evidence or judicial notice available explicating the
agency's result, or a remand to supply the gap.18
The seminal modern case on hard look review is Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. ("State Farm").19 In that case, the Department of
Transportation rescinded a passive restraint rule for automobiles without a persuasive statement of
reasons. "The first and most obvious reason for finding the rescission arbitrary and capricious," said the
Court, "is that [the agency] apparently gave no consideration whatever to modifying the Standard [in
order to accomplish its proffered regulatory objectives]."20 While this objection seems, on the surface,
to reflect a reasonable demand for the Court to impose, the declaration that the measure of what is or is
not "arbitrary and capricious," as defined by section 706(2)(A) of the APA, is whether the agency has
considered alternatives to its regulatory choice is a significant move. The requirement of a "reasoned
analysis" for the rule,21 combined with a reluctance to take the agency's stated reasons for making one

Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See generally J ERRY L. MASHAW &
DAVID L. HARFST , T HE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990); Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and
Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 507 (1985).
15

A classic early statement of the role of courts in supervising aggressively agency
performance is Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1669 (1975).
16

See generally CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, J R., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING
J UDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990); MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS T HE GUARDIANS?:
J UDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION (1988).
17

541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

18

Id. at 22 (footnote omitted).

19

463 U.S. 29 (1983).

20

Id. at 46.

21

Id. at 57 (quoting Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (1970)).
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choice rather than another,22 is the sine qua non of modern hard look review. 23 Moreover, the proof is
in the pudding, as the aftermath of State Farm was a significant expansion of judicial intervention in the
administrative process.24 Hard look has proved to be more than just a rhetorical twist; hard review has
impacted the processes of regulatory decisionmaking. 25
Hard look review has not come into the 21st century unqualified, however. The Chevron
doctrine, named for Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,26 in which the Supreme
Court established a two-part test for determining whether an agency's statutory interpretation has
earned deference by the reviewing court, has significantly impacted "scope of review" doctrine. From
one perspective, contemporary doctrine is deeply schizophrenic, with hard look review existing
alongside the "soft glance" of Chevron.27 A more persuasive account of these precedents, however, is
that Chevron remains limited to circumstances in which the agency is engaged in statutory
interpretation;28 in the ordinary circumstance in which an agency is exercising discretion under the
charge of its enabling act, courts still give agency decisions a mighty hard look.
Another qualification to modern hard look review is the "committed to agency discretion" line of
cases flowing from Heckler v. Chaney.29 In an early pivotal case, the Supreme Court had interpreted
the "committed to agency discretion" language of section 706(a)(2) of the APA to restrict judicial

22

Id. at 51-57.

23

See Garland, supra note 14, at 545-46; Stephen F. Williams, The Roots of Deference,
100 YALE L.J. 1103, 1107-08 (1991) (book review).
24

See, e.g., Troy Corp. v. Browner, 120 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Am. Fed'n of Labor
and Congress of Indus. Orgs. v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992).
25

See generally MASHAW & HARFST , supra note 14.

26

467 U.S. 837 (1984).

27

See, e.g., Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J., concurring) ("I
agree with the panel that despite these distinctions, the Chevron and State Farm frameworks often do
overlap."); see also Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1253, 1276 (1997) ("[T]he D.C. Circuit's strenuous efforts to divide up the terrain between
arbitrariness review and Chevron step two should be abandoned; the court, as well as other courts, would
do better simply to treat these two modes of analysis as equivalent.").
28

The contours of the Chevron doctrine remain controversial. While there have been
literally hundreds of appellate court cases applying and shaping the doctrine, the Supreme Court has only
recently endeavored to fashion some clearer guidelines for what circumstances create a "Chevron
question." See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Christensen v. Harris County,
529 U.S. 576 (2000). See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89
GEO . L.J. 833 (2001).
29

Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
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review of agency decisions to where there is "no law to apply."30 In Chaney, the Court significantly
expanded the "no law to apply" doctrine to cordon off all decisions in which the agency decides
whether, and to what extent, to exercise its enforcement discretion as unreviewable.31 The effect of this
ruling, and later rulings fleshing out the contours of reviewability doctrine,32 is to carve out a cul-de-sac
of unreviewable, agency decisions from the range of decisions subject to judicial scrutiny under the
APA. Although the boundaries of this category have remained since Chaney rather fluid,33 the
significance of the doctrine is clear: Hard look review is limited to those agency decisions that are
reviewable in the first instance. Per Chaney, where there is no law to apply, review is unavailable.34
Despite these qualifications, hard look review is well-entrenched in modern administrative
law.35 From any vantage point, it is clear that the emergence of hard look review in the 1970s has
reconfigured the regulatory playing field. Agency decisionmaking was affected in uncertain, but
palpable, ways by the heavy hand of the federal courts.36 Skeptical judges cast their gaze on the output
of complex agency activities; agencies predictably responded. The result was--and has been--an
equilibrium in which agencies, courts, and other interested public and private decisionmakers carry out
agency functions with due regard of the actions and reactions of one another.37
Whether this equilibrium is a good or bad thing depends upon an informed judgment of the role
30

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).

31

Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831.

32

See, e.g., Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988);
Farmworker Justice Fund, Inc. v. Brock, 811 F.2d 613 (D.C. Cir. 1987), vacated as moot, 817 F.2d 890
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Am. Horse Prot. Ass'n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
33

See Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74
MINN. L. REV. 689, 777 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney,
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 675-76 (1985).
34

While Chevron deference and unreviewability doctrine per Chaney represent the main
counter-currents to hard look review, there are other, more technical, administrative law doctrines that
function to curtail the discretion of the courts. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555
(1992) (standing); United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991) (sovereign immunity); Ticor Title Ins.
Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731 (1987) (ripeness/timing).
35

See e.g., Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of
Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243 (1999).
36

For empirical efforts to measure this impact, see, e.g., Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial
Legalism and American Government, 10 J. POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 369 (1991); Peter H. Schuck &
E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990
DUKE L.J. 984.
37

See McCubbins et al., supra note 11, at 433-34; see also Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller,
A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State
Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 263, 263-66 (1990).
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and function of agencies in the modern administrative state. Certainly hard look review has added to the
procedural complexity of agency performance. Insofar as some of these procedures have ensured
greater participation by affected groups, this move has enhanced the democratic components of agency
decisionmaking. More controversial is whether this review has yielded better "reasoned" agency
decisions.38
With the hindsight afforded by about a quarter century of hard look doctrine in the federal
courts, a number of preliminary observations can, I believe, be supported by available evidence:
(1) Agency decisionmaking has become increasingly expensive as procedural
requirements and other adjustments wrought by hard look review have emerged in the
modern period;39
(2) As a consequence of these costs and complexities, administrative law scholars have
spoken sensibly of what they label the "ossification" of regulatory decisionmaking.40
While the general issue is complex, the point is an intuitive one: agencies fear reversals
and, therefore, take pains to develop strong evidentiary bases for their regulatory
decisions. These "pains" can and do steer agencies away from tackling difficult social
and economic issues. Thus, the paradoxical result of hard look scrutiny is fewer bold
regulatory initiatives;41
(3) In order to survive scrutiny, agencies proliferate not only more cumbersome
procedures but, in particular, more court-like procedures.42 These procedures entail
the receipt and evaluation of evidence, the prohibition of certain informal contacts by
members of the public, and the substitution of "legal" for "political" judgment.43 On the
38

I leave to one side what I believe to be a perfectly pertinent, but very complicated,
question of how we discern what "well-reasoned" means in this context. For an interesting, far-reaching
discussion of reason and rationality in the context of democratic decisionmaking, see ARTHUR LUPIA &
MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, T HE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT T HEY NEED TO
KNOW? (1998).
39

See sources cited supra notes 14, 16.

40

See sources cited in supra note 9.

41

This is the essential lesson of Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst's influential study of the
National Highway Transportation Administration. See generally MASHAW & HARFST , supra note 14;
see also R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: T HE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT (1983)
(influential study of the EPA and the Clean Air Act).
42

See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, Comment: Rulemaking Ossification--A Modest Proposal,
47 ADMIN . L. REV. 453 (1995).
43

See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls
Over Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251 (1992).
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whole, agencies have developed models of decisionmaking that are more adversarial
and legalistic than one witnessed in an earlier era--or, to put the point more bluntly, one
might expect out of an administrative regime in a political context.44
There is much more one can say about the impact of hard look review on administrative agency
performance in the modern era. There is enough here, however, to make the general point that
contemporary administrative law has transformed--we might say even significantly transformed-regulatory decisionmaking. This observation frames the discussion in the next section of the remand
without vacatur device. While this device has been defended by the D.C. Circuit and other influential
commentators as an antidote to aggressive judicial review,45 the interaction between this mechanism and
hard look review suggests, I argue, that the practical case for remand without vacatur may be more
problematic than it might otherwise appear.
Tacit in the discussion to this point is the argument that the courts role ought to be more limited in
regulatory policymaking. To make the point more explicitly, I argue that there ought to be limits on
courts' use of liberal remedial devices to curtail agency behavior. Remedial discretion in administrative
law is designed primarily to protect individual rights from unlawful governmental action, not to maintain
what the courts believe to be balance within regulatory system. Balance-maintenance is part and parcel
of what agencies do.
B. The Case for Judicial Modesty in the Face of Regulatory Realism
Aggressive judicial review is expensive, any way you slice it. Whether these costs are justified,
of course, rests on one's views about the value of hard look review in improving agency performance.
Save for those significant situations in which judicial review is properly deployed to redress a
constitutional violation by an agency or to ensure that the agency is complying with the law as Congress
has instructed, the role of judicial review is controversial. How much should courts intervene in
regulatory decisionmaking to ensure that the commands of section 706 of the APA are met? This is a
question about which reasonable people differ, to put it mildly. The evidence described sketchily in the
previous section raises serious questions about whether and to what extent the hard look revolution has
been a salutary one; yet, the empirical evidence does not settle the question. The case for more
vigorous judicial scrutiny under APA section 706 must confront arguments--normative arguments-about the nature and scope of administrative agency decisionmaking. From my perspective, the central

44

See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57
(1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Lisa S. Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness
and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 462 (2003); Elena Kagan,
Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2246 (2001); Robert V. Percival, Presidential
Management of the Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 964-66
(2001); Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 984-85 (1997); Peter M.
Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential
Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 161 (1995).
45

See sources supra notes 6-8.
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question involves how we think agencies behave and what we believe are the structure of influences and
pressures they face in carrying out their regulatory functions.
Agency decisions are the result of factors both internal and external. Internal factors include, at
the very least, the strength of arguments of interested parties in cases involving formal adjudication and
licensing, the weight of the evidence as well as informed discretion in the case of rulemaking, and other
factors that contribute to the body of knowledge that drives agencies toward conclusions. It is naïve to
suppose that agencies make decisions only where the facts, law, and evidence point unequivocally in
one direction. More commonly, agencies "satisfice,"46 that is, form and implement judgments on the
basis of the best available evidence, with due recognition of the constraints of knowledge, resources,
and time.47 Although reasonable persons can differ about whether and to what extent this is a failing of
the administrative state, it can be said that agencies perform their task with admirable efficiency and
care given the world of great uncertainty and competing influences. To be a fan of the modern
administrative state is, to a great degree, to embrace uncertainty and the theory of the second-best.48
External factors on agency performance loom large as well. Agencies react ubiquitously to
congressional pressures;49 so too, do agencies respond to influences of executive branch officials.50
The nature of this influence is complex. Legislators may react through the technique of what has been
called "police patrols,"51 the ongoing oversight of regulatory performance in order to maintain the
smooth functioning of the administrative program in question. Alternatively lawmakers may investigate

46

HERBERT SIMON , MODELS OF MAN 204 (1957).

47

See generally Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PUB.
ADMIN . REV. 79 (1959).
48

A recent body of literature, building upon insights from cognitive psychology, makes the
more cynical claim that agency reasoning is plagued by cognitive difficulties. See, e.g., Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Getting Beyond Cynicism: Cognitive Psychology and Optimal
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549 (2002). See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS
(Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). Despite this empirically-based concern, other scholars insist that agencies
possess the skills, and ought to possess the will, to engage in rational, information intensive cost-benefit
analysis. These theories presuppose, it would seem, that the cognitive difficulties are not insurmountable.
See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political
Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137 (2001).
49

See, e.g., Daniel Cohen & Peter L. Strauss, Congressional Review of Agency
Regulations, 49 ADMIN . L. REV. 95 (1997); Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the
Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46 ADMIN . L. REV. 1 (1994).
50

See, e.g., Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical
Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821 (2003); Kagan, supra note 43.
51

See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, in CONGRESS: STRUCTURE AND POLICY 426 (Mathew
D. McCubbins et al. eds., 1987).
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agencies episodically, focusing on so-called "fire alarm" tactics.52 Audits, for example, enable
legislators and executive branch officials to investigate agency performance where decisions become
especially salient and where political officials can expect to make some specific, calibrated
interventions. These strategies are seldom "either/or." Political oversight of regulatory decisionmaking is
ubiquitous and agencies are properly concerned with the structure, timing, and motivation behind their
overseers' strategies. While the extent and scope of these influences are the product of many
circumstances, the mere fact of constant legislative and executive controls acts as a serious check on
agency performance.53
The extent of private sector influence on agency activity is more controversial. Public choice
theory insists that such influence is a regular part of the regulatory process.54 Yet, the evidence suggests
that such influence is irregular.55 Few believe that agencies are, in the terminology of Richard Stewart,
writing a quarter century ago, mere "transmission belts" for interest group influences.56 More
accurately, interest groups manifest influence over agencies through comparatively small, though
durable, actions. These weapons of influence no doubt impact agency decisions.57 Yet, within the
structure of the modern administrative state, these methods of influence contribute to agency results only
episodically. Few outside of the public choice fraternity believe that this influence is more important--or
even equivalently important--than the impact of political influence, that is, influence by the legislative and
executive branches.58

52

See id. at 427.

53

See generally PETER STRAUSS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS
138-237 (rev. 10th ed. 2003).
54

See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); Pablo T. Spiller, Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A
Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or "Let Them Be Bribed," 33 J.L. & ECON. 65
(1990).
55

See, e.g., J ERRY L. MASHAW, GREED , CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997); Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA . ST .
U. L. REV. 7 (2000); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the
Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1990).
56

Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1669, 1675 (1975).
57

See, e.g., Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic
Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD . 101 (1987).
58

Major political science studies have offered more complex examinations of the
determinants of agency performance. If there is a common thread in this disparate work, it is that there is
considerably more to the picture of regulatory policymaking than either the "transmission belt" theory or
the slavish obedience to political control theory indicates. See, e.g., DANIEL P. CARPENTER, T HE
FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS AND POLICY INNOVATION IN
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With regard to political influence, the regular interventions--and, indeed, the threatened
interventions--of legislators and the President are an important part of the process of checking agency
action.59 To be sure, administrative law doctrine in various ways regulates the ways in which legislative
and executive officials monitor agencies.60 The answer to the perennial question "who guards the
guardians" is multifaceted, yet it is clear that courts play a proper role in ensuring that agencies can carry
out their statutory responsibilities to make and enforce rules with only that monitoring by political actors
that is consistent with the Constitution's separation of powers and also with statutes that regulate
specifically the activities of Congress and the President. That said, the range of legislative and executive
powers in the administrative state is very broad. And this breadth is essential to steer administrative
agency decisionmaking in democratic directions. The fundamental challenge for the courts is to
maintain the ability of political officials in the legislative and executive branches to appropriately
supervise agency policymaking, while making sure that the constitutional rules are followed.61
We have considered how the emergence and persistence of hard look review and modern
administrative law doctrine can disrupt agency decisionmaking by upending the political, economic, and
social balances struck by agencies acting in good faith yet with incomplete information. The discussion
thus far has been intentionally abstract, for the aim of this section is to set the stage for an analysis in the
next section of the remand without vacatur device. More extended analyses elsewhere support the
claim that agency policymaking has been seriously damaged by aggressive judicial intervention.62
In light of these difficulties, a key test for any judicially created remedy in administrative law
should be whether and to what extent the remedy fuels interventionism and, thereby, thwarts sound
agency decisionmaking. At first glance, the remand without vacatur device appears to have the salutary
effect of reducing judicial impositions; it is, after all, less aggressive than simple vacatur. Appearances
can be deceiving, however. As we will see in the next section, this strategy may backfire.
III. THE INTUITIVELY SENSIBLE (BUT POTENTIALLY OVERSTATED) CASE
FOR REMAND WITHOUT VACATUR
To understand the remand without vacatur device, we must begin by understanding the basic

EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862-1928 (2001); D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, T HE
LOGIC OF DELEGATION: CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND T HE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS (1991).
59

In addition to the sources cited in supra notes 44, 49; see also Daniel B. Rodriguez,
Management, Control, and the Dilemmas of Presidential Leadership in the Modern Administrative
State, 43 DUKE L.J. 1180, 1181-89 (1994); Richard J. Lazarus, The Neglected Question of
Congressional Oversight of EPA: Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes (Who Shall Watch the Watchers
Themselves)?, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 210-18 (1991).
60

See STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 53, at 666.

61

See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM . L. REV. 573, 574-79 (1984).
62

See sources cited in supra notes 14-16.
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structure of judicial review of agency decisions. The APA provides that final agency actions, either rules
or orders, are reviewable by the proper federal court. The minimal standard of review for all agency
actions is found in section 702(2)(a). This section provides that the reviewing court "shall ... hold
unlawful and set aside agency action ... found to be--(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law[.]63 Where an agency decision occurs after a formal
adjudicatory or rulemaking hearing, the reviewing court should hold unlawful agency action
"unsupported by substantial evidence."64 In the ordinary case, therefore, the reviewing court will have
before it an agency decision and some record. In addition to considering whether the agency has acted
consistently with its statutory obligations, it will evaluate the agency's reasoning process to assure itself
that it meets the standards of rationality demanded by the APA's scope of review section. By its very
nature, the review of agency reasoning under section 706 goes beyond mere statutory interpretation. 65
Since the very beginning of American administrative law, and certainly since the adoption of the APA in
1946, section 706 review has been regarded as trans-statutory, as looking beyond the organic act and
to the agency's reasoning process.66
The sanction ordinarily available to the reviewing court is vacatur. This remedy flows from the
court's responsibility to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action."67 Vacatur, on its own terms, has
no necessary connection to the remedy of remand. Vacatur obliterates the agency decision. Remand in
administrative law represents an assignment by the court back to the agency. 68 While the APA does
not expressly authorize the reviewing court to issue a remand order,69 this order has long been

63

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).

64

Id. § 706(2)(E).

65

See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX . L.
REV. 113 (1998); Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994
SUP. CT . REV. 429.
66

See the discussion in Daniel B. Rodriguez, Jaffe's Law: An Essay on the Intellectual
Underpinnings of Modern Administrative Law Theory, 72 CHI.- KENT L. REV. 1159, 1182-83 (1997).
67

§ 706(2).

68

See Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla. v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2002),
discussed in infra text accompanying notes 101-107 ("Normally when an agency so clearly violates the
APA we would vacate its action ... and simply remand for the agency to start again.").
69

Indeed, there is nothing at all in the APA about remand orders. Rather, the APA provides
expressly for interim relief. See § 705 ("the reviewing court ... may issue all necessary and appropriate
process to postpone the effective date of an agency action or to preserve status or rights pending
conclusion of the review proceedings"). Despite this clear statutory charge to the courts to implement this
remedy, where they think it appropriate, the Supreme Court has suggested that statutory authorization is
not necessary for the courts to provide interim relief. See Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S.
4, 9-10 (1942). The suggestion that such remedial discretion is inherent in judicial power has implications
on the remand without vacatur issue, as I will discuss in more detail in Part III.
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regarded as well within the remedial discretion of the federal courts.70 Indeed, remand after vacating an
agency decision has been used frequently and over many decades to implement the will of the reviewing
court to strike down an agency decision while giving the agency a chance to correct its mistake. The
D.C. Circuit's development of the remand without vacatur technique is entirely judge-made; it provides
an intermediate device between the ordinary decision to vacate and remand an agency action and the
decision to uphold the agency action.
A. Garbled Explanations and Great Expectations: Remand Without Vacatur
To better grasp the remand without vacatur technique, consider the facts of Checkosky v.
SEC. The dispute in Checkosky involved a decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission to
penalize Savin Corporation for attempting to defer certain research and development expenditures as
capitalized assets instead of declaring them as ordinary business expenses. According to the SEC, this
effort violated generally accepted accounting principles and, therefore, constituted "'improper
professional conduct' in violation of the Commission's Practice Rule 2(e)."72 Messers. Checkosky and
Aldrich challenged the SEC's order on the ground that the order was unsupported by substantial
evidence. They also argued that this order could only apply, according to Rule 2(e) and the underlying
statute, to "willful misconduct."73
The difficulty the reviewing court faced, it explained, was determining what sort of standard the
agency applied in scrutinizing the defendants' conduct.74 In some respects, the agency appeared to
object to defendants' conduct on the grounds that they acted negligently, an objection that would carry
with it, the court argued, a very heavy burden for the agency to meet in order to exercise its
administrative authority.75 Elsewhere, the agency seems to suggest that recklessness is enough and that
71

70

See, e.g., ALFRED AMON , J R. & WILLIAM T. MEYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 447-49

(2d ed. 2001).
71

23 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Checkosky is not the first case in which the D.C. Circuit
used the remand without vacatur device; however, it contains the most extended discussion of the
efficacy and legality of the technique and is, therefore, discussed at length by commentators and by other
courts. See Levin, supra note 7 (manuscript at 10-14); Frank H. Wu & Denisha S. Williams, Remands
Without Reversal: An Unfortunate Habit, 30 ENVTL. L. REP . 10193, 10193-94 (2000); Prestes, supra
note 6, at 108-12.
72

Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 454; Practice Rule 2(e), 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1)(ii) (1993). Two
circuit courts before Checkosky had considered the underlying issue of the Commission's authority to
issue Rule 2(e). See Davy v. SEC, 792 F.2d 1418, 1421-22 (9th Cir. 1986); Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC,
609 F.2d 570, 575 (2d Cir. 1979).
73

17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1)(ii) (1993).

74

Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 456.

75

Id. at 459.
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defendants should be penalized because of their reckless behavior.76 However, the Commission "never
analyzed the evidence to explain just how petitioners' conduct could be thought to pass beyond
negligence to the greater degree of culpability--recklessness. Nor did the Commission specify just what
meaning it was giving the term reckless."77 Hence, the dilemma for the court was that the SEC was
imprecise in explaining the rationale for holding defendants' culpable. It was possible that the agency
decision could be upheld--that is, that the agency's conclusion that defendants engaged in "willful
misconduct" was supported by substantial evidence under the standards of the APA. 78 Yet, because
the SEC's explanation was ambiguous, it was possible to find that the agency applied an incorrect
standard of "willful misconduct."79
Given the uncertainty in discerning the basis upon which the Commission reached its final
decision, the Checkosky court was not prepared to reach the conclusion that the agency's decision was
unsupported by substantial evidence.80 "Absent such clarity," announced the court, "the proper course,
one that we follow today, is to remand so as to afford the agency an opportunity to set forth its view in
a manner that would permit reasoned review."81 Thus the court applied the technique of remand
without vacatur, a technique employed in numerous D.C. Circuit cases over a twenty or so year
period.82
76

Id. at 460.

77

Id.

78

Id. at 458-62.

79

The court in Checkosky considers this issue under the rubric of § 706 of the APA and,
thus, is properly viewed as a hard look review case. Interestingly, a perspective never discussed in the
case--and presumably not raised by the parties--is whether this case ought to be decided under the
Chevron test. After all, the linchpin of the court's concern is that the agency may have misconstrued the
phrase "willful misconduct." The problem with applying the Chevron test to this case, after all, may be
that we have no adequate basis to know, for reasons explained by the court, whether and to what extent
the SEC was engaging in statutory interpretation in reaching its result.
80

There is some confusion in the court's opinion about the standard of review. Although this
is a case in which the agency decision can be upheld only where supported by substantial evidence on the
record, the court frequently discusses the "lighter" arbitrary/capricious standard. See id. at 460, 462, 46465.
81

Id. at 462.

82

See Milk Train, Inc. v. Veneman, 310 F.3d 747, 755-56 (D.C. Cir. 2002); United Distrib.
Comm'n. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 88 F.3d 1105, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1996); A.L. Pharma, Inc. v.
Shalala, 62 F.3d 1484, 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Am. Water Works Ass'n v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266, 1275 (D.C.
Cir. 1994); Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 988 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Int'l Union United Mine Workers of Am. v. Fed.
Mine Safety and Health Admin., 924 F.2d 340 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Int'l Union United Mine Workers of Am.
v. Fed. Mine Safety and Health Admin., 920 F.2d 960, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990); City of Brookings Mun. Tel.
Co. v. FCC, 822 F.2d 1153, 1171-72 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Rodway v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 514 F.2d 809, 824
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Remand without vacatur is designed to give the agency another bite at the "explanation" apple.
Frequently what the court is concerned with in reviewing agency decisions is the rationale the agency
uses in forming its regulatory decision, the court remands the decision back to the agency to see
whether the agency can construct a rationale that would survive scrutiny.83 Of course, virtually all
outcomes in regulatory cases in which the agency decision is found wanting involve remands to the
agency in the sense that an agency can try again; the key twist in Checkosky and similar cases is that
the agency decision remains in place for a specified period of time. Sometimes the agency succeeds in
constructing a bullet-proof rationale; other times they fail. The agency decision is not frozen in place
forever, but merely for a time in which the agency is urged to return to the drawing board for further
analysis and explanation.84

(D.C. Cir. 1975).
There are a few remand without vacatur cases in other circuit courts. See, e.g., Cent. &
S.W. Servs., Inc. v. EPA, 220 F.3d 683, 702 (5th Cir. 2000); Idaho Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d
1392, 1406 (9th Cir. 1995); W. Oil & Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 633 F.2d 803, 814 (9th Cir. 1980).
83

It is important to distinguish this strategy from the decision of the reviewing court to
vacate an agency decision and remand to the trial court for a review of the agency's decision. The classic
case here is Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), in which the Supreme
Court faulted the reviewing court for failing adequately to review the agency's decision on the basis of the
full administrative record available to the agency at the time of its decision (or, perhaps more accurately,
for the record that should have been available). Id. at 415. In the absence of the sort of findings and
evidentiary basis that could inform the reviewing court's evaluation of the agency's decision, the solution,
according to the Overton Park Court, was a remand to the district court for "plenary review of the
[agency's] decision." Id. at 416.
In Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 140-43 (1973), the Supreme Court clarified the scope of
its Overton Park holding, noting that the proper next step following a remand to the trial court for a more
comprehensive review was not necessarily a trial de novo, nor a close inquiry into the mental processes of
the agency decisionmakers. See also United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941); Deukmejian v.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 751 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated in part pending rehearing en
banc, 760 F.2d 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd, 789 F.2d 26 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc). Rather, "the focal
point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record
made initially in the reviewing court." Camp, 411 U.S. at 142.
Overton Park and its progeny are extremely important in establishing the obligation of
the reviewing court to consider and critically examine whether and to what extent the agency based its
decision, even in an informal decisionmaking setting, on the basis of evidence and relevant information
and not speculative and "improper" factors; moreover, this line of cases reinforces the idea that courts
should review the agency decision on the basis of the contemporaneous record, not on the basis of post
hoc rationalizations and "litigation affidavits." See Volpe, 401 U.S. at 415. However, nothing in the
Overton Park doctrine suggests whether the lower court, in carrying out its responsibilities, should refrain
from remanding without vacating the agency's decision.
84

The agency does not always prevail in the end, as the facts of Tex Tin Corp. v. EPA,
935 F.2d 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1991), indicate. In this case, the EPA's plea that its decision to place a
hazardous waste facility on the National Priorities List should be upheld based upon "common sense" was
rejected and the court remanded the decision back to the EPA for a better explanation. Id. at 1324. The
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Checkosky provides an illustration of one important circumstance in which the reviewing court
believes the device is appropriate: Where the basis of the agency decision is insufficiently clear and,
therefore, where the reviewing court would profit from sending the case back to the agency for a more
complete explanation. This strategy hearkens back to the Supreme Court's injunction in SEC v.
Chenery Corp.,85 a seminal early administrative law case in which the Court cautioned reviewing courts
to avoid upholding an agency decision on a basis other than the one advanced by the agency. 86 The
Chenery Court sensibly limited judicial review to the agency's stated rationale; reviewing courts ought
not to come up with a basis for upholding the agency's decision that has not been articulated clearly by
the agency itself.87 The D.C. Circuit in Checkosky tied the remand without vacatur device tightly to the
Chenery holding, noting that "'[s]ince courts cannot exercise their duty of review unless they are
advised of the considerations underlying the action under review,' reviewing courts will often ... pause
before exercising full judicial review and remand to the agency for a more complete explanation of a
troubling aspect of the agency's decision."88
While the use of the remand without vacatur device has remained controversial, both within the
scholarly literature and within the circuit itself, the court has continued to use it to temper the impact of
its disapprovals in the modern hard look era. A good recent example of its use is in Milk Train, Inc. v.
Veneman.89 In this case, the court considered a decision by the Secretary of Agriculture to use some
federal money to compensate farmers for losses incurred during 1998.90 Trouble was that Congress
had expressly appropriated funds to compensate dairy farmers "for economic losses incurred during

agency's later explanation still fell short, according to the court, and the decision was, in the end, struck
down as arbitrary and capricious. Tex Tin Corp. v. EPA, 992 F.2d 353, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1993). These
cases, and other instances in which the agency failed twice, are discussed in Checkosky, 23 F.2d at 463.
85

318 U.S. 80 (1943) (Chenery I).

86

Id. at 87-89.

87

See generally Henry J. Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and
Remand of Administrative Orders, 1969 DUKE L.J. 199 (analyzing how courts have determined when
Chenery requires reconsideration).
88

Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 463 (internal citations omitted); see also U.S. Dep't of Defense v.
Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 982 F.2d 577, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Sullivan Indus. v. NLRB, 957 F.2d 890,
905 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Radio Station KFH Co. v. FCC, 247 F.2d 570, 572 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
89

310 F.3d 747 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (the FCC must make the basis of its action "reasonably

90

Id. at 755-56.

clear").
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1999."91 The court remanded the regulations to the Secretary without vacating them.92 The court was
clearly motivated by the fact that it would be nearly impossible to get back to the status quo ante since
the money had already been distributed to the farmers. The majority hoped that the Secretary could,
following the remand, come up with an adequate explanation for the use of these funds in this manner.93
Milk Train represents one key factor in the court's use of this remedial device: the tremendous hardship
that would occur if a flawed rule were immediately vacated. This, combined with the court's optimism
that the agency could fix the problem by recreating its decisional rationale, fuels the court's frequent, if
controversial,94 use of this technique.
A somewhat different circumstance in which the D.C. Circuit has applied the remand without
vacatur device, is where the agency's rationale is clear, but cannot, on its own terms, provide adequate
support for the legality of its decision. A good example of the use of the device in this circumstance is
American Medical Ass'n v. Reno.95 In that case, the Drug Enforcement Agency promulgated a fee
schedule under the Controlled Substances Act96 without providing for notice and comment.97 The
court acknowledged that such notice and comment was clearly required by the APA and, therefore, the
agency violated this statute.98 However, the court declined to vacate the agency's decision, on the
grounds that such a remand would create an "obvious hardship" to the agency.99 The court remanded
the decision back to the agency for correction of this mistake.100
This error-correction function of remand without vacatur appears prominently in several D.C.
Circuit cases over the past decade.101 Two years ago, in Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of

91

Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-78, § 805, 113 Stat. 1135, 1179 (1999).
92

Milk Train, 310 F.3d at 756.

93

Id.

94

See id. at 760-63 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).

95

57 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

96

21 U.S.C. § 811 (2000).

97

57 F.3d at 1131-32.

98

Id. at 1132.

99

Id. at 1135.

100

Id. at 1135-36.

101

See, e.g., Allied Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 988 F.2d 146, 154
(D.C. Cir. 1993); Massachusetts v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 924 F.2d 311, 337 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
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Florida v. Veneman,102 the D.C. Circuit rejected the argument by the agency that it should not have to
follow the section 553 processes of developing rulemaking because the regulatory program at issue
"was an 'isolated agency act' that did not propose to affect subsequent Department acts and had 'no
future effect on any other party before the agency."' 103 It, therefore, was not a rule under the APA
section 551(4) definition.104 The court rejected this argument, but declined to vacate the agency's
rule.105 Recollecting the contemporary strand of remand without vacatur cases, the court said:
Appellants insist that we have no discretion in the matter; if the Department violated the
APA--which it did--its actions must be vacated. But that is simply not the law. Instead,
"[t]he decision whether to vacate depends on 'the seriousness of the order's deficiencies
(and thus the extent of doubt whether the agency chose correctly) and the disruptive
consequences of an interim change that may itself be changed ...."' We have previously
remanded without vacating when the agency failed to follow notice-and-comment
procedures.106
Although the device of remand without vacatur is used exactly the same here as elsewhere, the
rationale behind the remedy in Sugar Cane Growers is different than its use in Checkosky and Milk
Train. In contrast to these two cases, the court in Sugar Cane Growers uses the remand without
vacatur device to give the agency another chance to correct an error. Though holding that the agency
has acted unlawfully, the court utilizes its remedial discretion to soften the blow to the agency. The
agency must correct its mistake by using the APA-prescribed rulemaking process as a condition for
continuing to enforce its enacted rule.107
B. The Purposes Served and Disserved by Remand Without Vacatur

102

289 F.3d 89 (2002).

103

Id. at 95-96 (quoting Daingerfield Island Protective Soc'y v. Babbitt, 823 F. Supp. 950,
957 (D. D.C. 1993) aff'd in relevant part, 15 F.3d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
104

Section 551(4) defines a rule as "the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy." 5
U.S.C. § 551(4) (2000).
105

289 F.3d at 97-98.

106

Id. at 99 (internal citations omitted).

107

In this sense, the rule in place after the court's decision and before the agency returns to
court is akin to an interim rule, a device not squarely described in the APA, but one nonetheless utilized by
agencies, for example, the Internal Revenue Service, to implement its policy while the rulemaking process
is underway. See Michael Asimow, Interim-Final Rules: Making Haste Slowly, 51 ADMIN . L. REV.
703, 704 (1999).
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Remand without vacatur aims to accomplish three aims simultaneously: (1) to give the agency
opportunity to improve its reasoning process;108 (2) to maintain stability of regulatory system while the
dispute continues;109 and (3) to protect the "reliance interests" of individuals and firms.110 Each of these
issues deserve to be taken very seriously; after all, each of them--good reasoning, stability, and reliance
interests--are of critical importance in the successful functioning of the administrative state. We consider
each in turn.
Facilitating sound agency reasoning is the sine qua non of modern hard look review. The APA
requires agency decisions to pass, at the very least, the threshold of arbitrary and capricious review. 111
It is only by evaluating the reasons and rationales proffered by the agency that the reviewing court can
satisfy itself that the administrative decision is neither arbitrary nor capricious (or, depending upon the
proper standard of review, is supported by substantial evidence).112 It would seem, therefore, that
anything that enables the reviewing court to make better sense of the agency's reasoning process would
be a valuable practical device.
While this is a sensible argument in favor of the remand without vacatur device, there are two
considerations that militate against its use for this purpose. First, there are limits to how far reviewing
courts should go to fine-tune agency reasoning. The basic standard of review in administrative law-arbitrary/capricious review--requires that the agency pass a "plausibility" threshold, not that it articulate
a full blown empirical and theoretical basis for choosing one outcome rather than another. To illustrate
this point, consider the lodestar modern hard look case, State Farm.113 Suppose that the Secretary of
Transportation had rescinded the extant passive restraints requirement on the grounds that it was putting
its resources behind strategies to reduce the ill-effects of second-order collisions in ways other than by
requiring the installation of airbags in automobiles and that, therefore, the benefits of the passive restraint
rule was outweighed by the costs. The reviewing court--and perhaps the public, for that matter--may
prefer a better rationale than that; they may deplore the agency's cost/benefit tradeoff and may also
expect a more elaborate justification for the agency choice.114 However, so long as the agency can
persuade the reviewing court that this decision is within the boundaries of its statutory charge, this
108

See Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 462 (1994).

109

See Levin, supra note 7 (manuscript at 6) ("Vacation of an action can upset a legal
regime on which many citizens depend.").
110

See id. ("A second theme in the case law ... is protection of reliance interests.").

111

5 U.S.C. § 706(1)(A) (2000).

112

§ 706(1)(E). One of the defining features of hard look review is the merging of more
interventionist substantial evidence review with arbitrary and capricious review. See, e.g., Peter Strauss,
Comment, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463 (1992).
113

463 U.S. 29 (1983).

114

Or, to be fair, the public may welcome the use of cost/benefit analysis by responsible
agencies in implementing their charge to create optimal regulatory policy. See generally CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, T HE COST -BENEFIT STATE (2002).
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decision would likely be upheld even under a hard look review standard.
I draw the hard look doctrine back to the point I raised in the previous section in connection
with "internal factors" influencing agency outcomes.115 Agencies satisfice; they do not necessarily arrive
at the best regulatory outcome. Correspondingly, the role of the reviewing court is to ensure that they
have acted within the wide band of what is reasonable; it is not to figure out ways to get the agency's
reasoning closer toward the ideal of perfection. 116 Therefore, the argument that the remand without
vacatur device improves agencies' reasoning process assumes its own conclusion; the objective
attached to the device ought not to be an objective at all.
Second, there are many instances in which the remand without vacatur device is used despite
the fact that the agency has in fact articulated well the basis of its decision. The problem from the court's
perspective in cases such as AMA and Sugar Cane Growers is not that the reasoning is generally
poor; it is that the agency decision is fundamentally flawed. Thus, the decision to remand without
vacatur does not enhance the agency's reasoning, so much as it gives the agency the opportunity to
correct a mistake. In these circumstances, a reviewing court can accomplish its objective of improving
agency reasoning just as easily, if not more so, by vacating the agency rule or order and remanding it
back to the agency for reconsideration than by leaving the rule/order intact during the interim.
Frequently, a reviewing court upends the agency decision, yet telegraphs rather clearly to the agency
what it must do to survive judicial rule next time. If the intention is to get the agency to correct its
mistake, vacatur is much stronger medicine than remand without vacatur. To be sure, this stronger
medicine comes at the cost of inflicting hardship on the agency and perhaps also on the parties relying
on the rule. Yet, my point here is only that the error-correcting function of remand without vacatur does
not really explain why the "without vacatur" is useful other than for the reason that hardship is thereby
avoided. We are left with little reason, then, to believe that this ameliorative device helps improve
agency reasoning or is a more efficacious technique for correcting serious agency errors.
Moreover, there are good reasons to suppose that an agency will be motivated both ex ante
and ex post to adopt rules in a manner that will pass muster if they know that they face the prospect of
vacatur if they fail. As discussed in Part I of this article, these incentive effects are not necessarily
salutary;117 I question the degree to which courts micro-manage agency decisionmaking by threatening
judicial intervention. The stories told by social scientists and legal scholars who have closely studied
regulatory decisionmaking and the impact of the federal courts in particular policy contexts suggest that
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See text accompanying supra notes 15-21.
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But see Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992). Professor Seidenfeld offers an elegant counter-theory, describing the
ways in which agency decisionmaking can, when properly constructed and supervised, realize much more
aspirational, grandiose aims. He notes: "[T]he paradigmatic process for agency formulation of policy-informal rulemaking--is specifically geared to advance the requirements of civic republican theory ....
With proper constraints on bureaucratic decisionmaking ... the administrative state holds the best promise
for achieving the civic republican ideal of inclusive and deliberative lawmaking." Id. at 1560-76.
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See text accompanying supra notes 39-44.
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the agency motivations wrought by activist judicial review has been problematic.118 However, if we
take on face value the opposite view propounded by advocates of hard look review, that is, that
agencies should be incentivized to reconfigure agency decisionmaking and to engage in more, rather
than less, elaborate administrative processes prior to the development and implementation of a
regulation or order, then it is not at all clear that the middle-ground device of remand without vacatur
has more desirable incentive effects than the heavier stick of simple vacatur. True, the remand without
vacatur device can be viewed as an optimizing strategy, one that strikes a balance between the
disincentives for agencies to adopt rules in the face of aggressive, costly judicial review and the
incentive for the agency to "get it right." But, the problem with this viewpoint is that it is in tension with
the underlying theory behind hard look review, a theory that is designed to force agencies to engage in
more elaborate and "synoptic" agency decisionmaking.119
A significant second consideration that is advanced in favor of the remand without vacatur
device is that it promotes stability in the administrative process. It is a practical device by which courts
can finetune the administrative process by careful, calculated intervention. It is a scalpel, not a
blunderbuss. And it seems to respect better than the blunt tool of simple remand the interests of the
agency in carrying out its regulatory functions with a minimal amount of judicial intrusion.
Both Ronald Levin and Richard Pierce express great sympathy to the remand without vacatur
technique on this ground. Says Levin:
In a number of decisions, [courts] have resorted to remand without vacation in order to
prevent an unduly disruptive interruption in a regulatory regime ... [T]he device of
remand without vacation enables the government to ... maintain stability in a regulatory
regime while the agency is working on its response to the court's concerns. It is, in
short, an accommodation of the agency's interests, not an invasion of its turf. This is one
context in which Justice Frankfurter's characterization of courts and agencies as
"collaborative instrumentalities of justice" seems to have particular force.120
Professor Richard Pierce ties the device to the effort to combat the "ossification" of regulatory
decisionmaking. By providing the agencies with greater flexibility, they will feel more free, so the
argument goes, to expend the effort to enact rules; moreover, the superior partnership nurtured
between courts and agencies will reduce the defensiveness, avoidance, and other noxious behaviors
characteristic of agencies in an environment in which hard look review overlays all agency rulemaking
and, therefore, in which the game may not be worth the candle. Both of these arguments are variations
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See sources cited in supra notes 14-16.
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See Colin Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV.
393, 393-434 (1981); see also SHAPIRO, supra note 16, at 14- 35.
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Levin, supra note 7 (manuscript at 6, 65). The Frankfurter reference is to United States
v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (Morgan IV).
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on essentially the same theme: Remand without vacatur is pro-agency.121
The "stability" rationale is appealing. Reducing the effects of judicial review in the hard look
review appears to streamline the administrative process. This streamlining is just what the doctor
ordered for those concerned with regulatory ossification. 122 Yet, there is a way in which this device
may have the opposite effect. I note here in passing an argument I will develop in more detail below:
that the device contributes to courts' interventionist strategies and thus, paradoxically, expands rather
than contracts judicial review. But there is a second reason for skepticism about the "stability/antiossification" result. Recall that remand without vacatur preserves the status quo while the agency returns
to the drawing board. There is no clear incentive, save for a timetable that the court establishes--and
my reading of the cases suggest that such timetables are quite rare--for the agency to diligently redesign
its decision and rationale and to return to the court for its approval. Hence, the regulatory process bears
costs while the process slowly unfolds. To be sure, these costs are not primarily litigation costs, but so
long as the agency's decision is preserved while it takes its time to re-examine its regulatory rationale,
there are costs to the system nonetheless. Recalling the Checkosky case, note that Messers.
Checkosky and Aldrich remain subject to the penalties imposed by the SEC while the agency proceeds
post-remand. While there may be a stay available to them pending further proceedings, this stay is
discretionary; in addition, they still run the risk of having this penalty upheld after the subsequent judicial
proceeding--whenever that happens.
In the end, remand without vacatur may trade one solution to the ossification problem for
another problem. Even if we agree that agencies like remand without vacatur, this does not mean that
the costs associated with ossification, and hence with the regulatory process more generally, dissipate.
Remand without vacatur is still a remand; agencies do not escape searching review by greater use of
this device in the federal courts. Moreover, the incentives on the part of agencies to delay while they
reconstruct their rationales seem rather strong. In a world in which delay and uncertainty represent
costs to the regulatory system--and, therefore, ossify the administrative process--the remand without
vacatur device does not clearly promote stability and may, in fact, even exacerbate it.
The third rationale for the device is that it protects the reliance interests of parties involved in the
regulatory dispute. On the surface, this rationale seems quite odd. If the agency's decision is flawed, so
flawed that the reviewing court remands it back to the agency for further consideration, then we might
doubt that the reliance interests of (1) the agency, and (2) the individual or firm's interests represented
by the agency, ought to be respected at all. After all, these individuals have relied on an administrative
decision of dubious validity. But the reality of the situation is more complicated than that. Agencies
promulgate rules after a good deal of pre-implementation process. Although regulated industries and
individuals bear the risk that these rules may ultimately be overturned, while challenges wind their way
through courts, they surely conduct themselves in accordance with the established rules adopted by the
agencies. As Ron Levin notes: "Frequently, when a rule is held invalid after it has already gone into
effect, private citizens will already have arranged their expectations around it. Companies may have
121

Levin notes that the "agencies do not object to the use of that device. In fact, it is usually
agencies themselves that seek this type of relief, because it serves their interests." Levin, supra note 7
(manuscript at 65).
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entered into contracts, made capital investments, and shifted business operations in light of the rule."123
It would seem only prudent for us to give some deference to these settled expectations in designing
remedies in administrative law.
This deference has been made considerably more difficult by the Supreme Court's 1988
decision in Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital.124 In this case, the Court restricted severely
the circumstances in which an agency can apply its rule retroactively. The Department of Health and
Human Services had promulgated regulations which provided that it "shall ... (ii) provide for the making
of suitable retroactive corrective adjustments."125 "It is axiomatic," declared Justice Kennedy for the
Court, "that an administrative agency's power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to the
authority delegated by Congress."126 Axiomatic? Well, maybe. However, the Court had never squarely
held that agency rules could not be applied retroactively in the manner suggested by the Medicare
Act.127 Indeed, retroactivity had functioned for years as a useful means by which courts tempered the
impact of agency reversals.128 Even where the rule was vacated, individuals and firms who may have
relied upon the rule in place could expect some attention to be paid to their plight when the agency
adopted a "corrected" rule subsequently. Both Pierce and Levin point out that the rise in the remand
without vacatur technique can be attributed to the demise of retroactive rulemaking after Georgetown
Hospital.129 Although the D.C. Circuit has not made this connection with Georgetown Hospital
explicitly, the interaction between these two doctrines seems rather obvious. As Peter Strauss, Todd
Rakoff, and Cynthia Farina put it in their notes following the Georgetown Hospital decision: "By
casting doubt on agencies' legal authority to cure defective rulemakings retrospectively, Bowen raises
the stakes for a court trying to craft an appropriate remedy (and perhaps also for any agency
deliberately choosing between adjudicatory and rulemaking approaches)."130
The "reliance interests" argument for remand without vacatur is a strong one. Protecting the
legitimate expectations of those subject to administrative rules and, therefore, those most vulnerable to
the perturbations of judicial processes, is a sound justification for designing pragmatic administrative law
techniques. As I indicated in the opening paragraph of this essay, administrative law rules are essentially
123

Levin, supra note 7 (manuscript at 6).
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See William V. Luneberg, Retroactivity and Administrative Rulemaking, 1991 DUKE
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See Levin, supra note 7 (manuscript at 46-58) (discussing retroactivity in administrative
decisionmaking, and its connection to remand without vacatur).
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See Pierce, supra note 7, at 75-76 (remand without vacation in D.C. Circuit "was
motivated largely by a desire to avoid the potential disruptive effects" of Georgetown Hospital).
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See Strauss, supra note 61, at 583.

https://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art27

24

Rodriguez:

practical devices for regulating agencies and also the courts that review such agencies. Given the
legitimate interest in protecting these reliance interests, is the remand without vacatur device a good
one? It is, I argue, an inadequate solution to a problem wrought by Georgetown Hospital and,
perhaps more fundamentally, the Court's incoherent doctrines concerning administrative law remedies.
The Georgetown Hospital doctrine restricts a very practical mechanism employed by agencies to
temper the impact of judicial decisions. The inability of the agency to correct decisions retroactively not
only disrupts settled expectations of parties, it also creates ex ante incentive effects on the part of
agencies, leaving agencies in a bind in deciding how to regulate in the first instance. While it is not
surprising to see the courts struggle with salvaging some degree of protection of reliance interests and
doing so through the creative device of remand without vacatur, we ought not to lose sight of what is
the essential problem: A crabbed reading of the APA that restricts the agency's ability to act
retroactively cuts off one key means of regulatory flexibility. And remand without vacatur is an
inadequate substitute. The question remains to be seen whether it is a substitute whose benefits
outweigh, or are outweighed by, its costs.
C. Remand Without Vacatur Revisited: Gift Horse or Trojan Horse?
The discussion to now has focused on the practical questions of whether and to what extent the
remand without vacatur device accomplishes its aims of facilitating agency reasoning, stability in
regulatory administration, and protection of reliance interests. Despite my arguments in the previous
section that the benefits attributed to the remand without vacatur device are overstated, I expect that
the reader up until now may be left with the conclusion that many scholars and a majority on the D.C.
Circuit have found attractive, namely, that remand without vacatur is on balance sensible as a strategy
for improving the administrative process somewhat. While no panacea, it improves regulatory outcomes
while maintaining stability and the reliance interests of affected parties. It is, in short, quintessentially
what remedial discretion is all about: Crafting judicial strategies within the boundaries of law to facilitate
sound regulatory decisionmaking. What is not to like?
One answer to that question has been proffered by dissenting voices in the D.C. Circuit,
particularly Judges Raymond Randolph and David Sentelle, both of whom have objected to the remand
without vacatur device on the grounds that it violates the Administrative Procedure Act.131 While I
agree with the D.C. Circuit majority and with Professors Pierce and Levin that this argument is
ultimately unpersuasive, it is worth considering seriously at least as a window into how and why judges
disagree about the nature and scope of remedial discretion. Moreover, the debate within the D.C.
Circuit encapsulates familiar disagreements about formalism and functionalism in administrative law,
disagreements that should shape our understandings about administrative law remedies generally.
1.

When Does Shall Mean Shall? The Legal Arguments over Remand Without Vacatur

131

See Milk Train, Inc. v. Veneman, 310 F.3d 747, 758 (2002) (Sentelle, J., dissenting);
Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 466, 466 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Randolph, J., concurring); see also Util. Solid
Waste Activities Group v. EPA, 236 F.3d 749 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Randolph, J.). Because of this
disagreement within the circuit, Ron Levin notes that "remand without vacation continues to exist, but its
availability may depend on the composition of a particular panel." Levin, supra note 7 (manuscript at 14).
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In particular, Judges Randolph and Sentelle have articulated the view that the remand without
vacatur device violates APA section 706.132 This section provides that a court "shall ... hold unlawful
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be--(A) arbitrary, capricious, and
abuse, or otherwise not in accordance with law."133 Randolph and Sentelle read this language as
prohibiting the court from remanding an agency decision without setting it aside. As a matter of strict
statutory construction, this view has substantial merit. Certainly this interpretation makes the most sense
of the strong term "shall." Moreover, there is support for this construction in statements by Justices
Kennedy and Scalia. Negotiating the terms of the Georgetown Hospital in an early draft of the
majority opinion, Kennedy proposed that courts could "stay invalidation of the challenged regulation
pending curative rulemaking."134 Justice Scalia reacted strongly to this suggestion, declaring that "I think
we would be buying grief to suggest that a court may exercise its equitable discretion to disregard this
provision by leaving a regulation 'not in accordance with law' in effect."135
Caselaw on the interpretation of the word "shall" is, alas, unilluminating. What the Court
frequently says in connection with regulatory policymaking and the role of the courts is that the courts
retain a great deal of remedial discretion. This remedial discretion is not unlimited, of course; for
example, in Hecht Co. v. Bowles,136 the Court conceded that an "unequivocal statement of [legislative]
purpose," could restrict the courts' use of equitable principles to overcome rather clear statutory
direction.137 This hornbook rule of law confuses as much as clarifies, however, since the key question
remains what represents such an "unequivocal statement?" Suffice it to say for our purposes that no
federal court has defined the word "shall" to limit altogether the discretion of the court to provide interim
relief, equitable relief of another sort or, more specifically, to implement the remand without vacatur
strategy. Moreover, the tenor of the Supreme Court decisions permitting the federal courts to exercise
broad remedial powers suggests that the "shall" injunction of section 706(1) does not clearly restrict the
courts' remand without vacatur strategy.
In his thorough article on the remand without vacatur question, Professor Levin recounts in
detail the statutory and legislative history arguments for the proposition that section 706(1) does not
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See Milk Train, 310 F.3d at 758; Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 466.
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5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
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This information is gleaned from Professor Levin's examination of the Justices' private
papers made available recently thanks to Justice Thurgood Marshall. See Levin, supra note 7 (manuscript
at 49) (quoting from first draft of the opinion of the Court (circulated Nov. 22, 1988), at 11-12). I have not
examined these papers myself in order to confirm Professor Levin's review.
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See Levin, supra note 7 (manuscript at 50) (citing "Letter from Justice Scalia to Justice
Kennedy, at 1-2 (Nov. 28, 1998)). Professor Levin also points out that Justices Stevens and Blackmun
expressed agreement with Justice Scalia's concerns. Id. at 50 & n.243.
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restrict remand without vacatur.138 I will not recount in similar detail his arguments here, since the thrust
of my argument is concerned with a different, more practical, set of considerations. I will simply
describe the reasoning underlying his conclusion, a conclusion that I find persuasive as an accounting of
the APA and this remedial device:
•

Section 706's "shall" language should be construed not "in isolation," but "in light
of a longstanding judicial presumption that militates against a finding that
Congress has placed curbs on the courts' remedial discretion."139 Many cases
involving a range of judicial remedies support the presumption that the courts'
traditional remedial discretion and equity powers are to be preserved.140

•

Closely related statutory provisions support the notion that the APA preserves
broad remedial discretion. 141 Not only do the core statutes on federal judicial
powers grant to courts wide-ranging remedial powers, including the power of
remand and the power to "require such further proceedings to be had as may
be just under the circumstances,"142 but so too does the APA in the section
immediately proceeding section 706. In section 705, the courts are given the
power to "issue all necessary and appropriate process ... to preserve status or
rights pending conclusion of the review proceedings."143

•

While the legislative history is inconclusive, the context of the section,
"consisting of the provision as a whole, related provisions, and its enactment
history" points to a conclusion that "shall" need not be construed in a strict,
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Levin, supra note 7 (manuscript at 14-19).
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Id. at 15.

140

Id. at 15-16; see, e.g., Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000). Professor Levin also
describes Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988), as a case reinforcing the courts' broad equity powers.
See Levin, supra note 7 (manuscript at 18-19). I would not read Webster as would Levin. Yes, the Court
notes in dicta that "traditional equitable principles requiring the balancing of public and private interests
control the grant of declaratory or injunctive relief in the federal courts"; however, this is fairly read as a
mere restatement of the general equity powers of the trial courts in connection with these conventional
forms of relief. See Webster, 486 U.S. at 604-05. The statement does not really bear on the question at
hand, namely, whether the reviewing courts in federal administrative law cases could or should use their
equity powers to superintend certain regulatory processes. In any event, Professor Levin's general point
about the broad remedial powers of the federal courts in administrative law cases is valid.
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formalistic way.144 For example, the last clause of the section states that "due
account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error."145 This, and other openended provisions in this section, indicates that Congress designed this provision
to maintain a suitable amount of judicial discretion.
The remand without vacatur device can be utilized by the courts consistently with APA section
706. The device is consistent with the courts' use of its broad remedial powers. Despite my confidence
that this is the right statutory result, the utilization of this tactic remains mired in controversy within the
D.C. Circuit, undecided by the Supreme Court and, at least thus far, not especially tempting to other
circuit cases. In the main, the controversy reflects a battle among formalist judges. Judge Silberman, the
author of Sugar Cane Growers and Checkosky and, therefore, the main voice on the circuit for the
remand without vacatur device develops the case for this device mostly on the basis of a formalistic
rationale. He describes the court's approach in Checkosky as "with[holding] full judicial review and
therefore not yet determin[ing] whether the agency action is arbitrary and capricious."146 By proceeding
cautiously and requiring a fuller rationale "before deciding whether the agency's action violated
administrative law,"147 the court, says Silberman, avoids Judge Randolph's syllogism that goes as
follows:
Major premise: An agency that fails to explain adequately its actions violates the APA
Minor premise: All actions that violate the APA must be set aside
Conclusion: Since here the agency has failed to explain adequately its actions must
have its decision set aside.148
The flaw in Randolph's reasoning, insists Silberman, is in the first premise; on the contrary, the
court cannot yet discern whether the agency has explained adequately its actions.149 Until it is able to
resolve this question, the agency's decision remains frozen in time; remanding the matter back to the
agency assists the court in making this decision at some point in the future.
This formalistic debate misses out on a different type of analysis, an analysis that is revealed in a
tiny number of the remand without vacatur cases and the small, but vigorous, scholarly debate on the
144

Levin, supra note 7 (manuscript at 16).
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Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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remand without vacatur device. This analysis is more avowedly functionalist, looking at the question
whether this remedial device is appropriate for courts to use in judicial review cases under section 706
and, moreover, what sort of rules/limits should be imposed in courts in employing this device. This
functionalist mode of reasoning is, to me, more appropriate in light of the central issues of remedial
discretion, judicial strategy, and agency performance implicated by the remand without vacatur device
and, for that matter, judicial remands in administrative law more generally. It is to the conspicuously
functional considerations implicated by remand without vacatur that I now turn.
2.

Promoting Judicial Activism through Judicial Restraint: The Paradox of the MiddleGround

At first glance, remand without vacatur seems ideally suited to a regime in which courts are
concerned with scrutinizing carefully agency performance but are also interested in preserving a decent
amount of administrative discretion. The device represents a plausible middle ground between two
extremes, one entailing complete agency discretion and the abdication of the judiciary's responsibilities
under section 706, the other a rigorous, powerful mode of review in which the agency risks invalidation
for an insufficiently precise rationale or ultimately correctable mistake. Criticizing this device on practical
grounds seems like looking the proverbial judicial gift horse in the mouth.
Yet there is a practical deficiency in this device. The essential deficiency is this: The availability
of the remand without vacatur device liberates the court to engage in searching review where such
review may, by its very nature, be unduly interventionist. While I would concede that once the review is
underway, remand without vacatur may, in many circumstances, be preferable to simple vacatur. But I
resist the notion that the middle-ground device exists to preserve agency flexibility in a world in which
searching judicial review of agency reasoning is inevitable.
To illustrate this deficiency, we should look carefully at the strategic considerations that animate
courts in considering how best to implement their review strategy in the first instance. To this point in
our discussion, we have been focusing nearly exclusively on the reviewing courts' responsibilities under
section 706 of the APA. Viewed in a vacuum, the court is always reviewing agency decisions. The only
questions are how to evaluate the agency's decision under the fairly broad standards of sections 706
(1)(A) and (E). The remedy, whether vacatur or remand without vacatur, follows the reviewing courts'
examination of the agency's decision and its reasoning.
This description of regulatory review is misleading, however. The structure of analysis
described above begins in the middle of the story, rather than at the beginning. Section 706 review
obtains where (1) an agency decision is final, and (2) where is an agency is reviewable under the
standards of sections 701-704 of the APA. Neither of these requirements is pro forma; rather, they
are each important legal prerequisites to the availability of judicial review. Therefore, the answer to the
question "is this agency decision reviewable?" is prior to the question of how the agency's decision is to
be evaluated under the rubric of section 706.
Notwithstanding the clear textual separation between the availability of review and the scope of
review questions, administrative law doctrine has frequently conflated the two inquiries. With respect to
the issue of "finality," federal courts have grappled over the years with the issue of "ripeness,"
considering when judicial review of agency actions should occur. The issue is seldom an easy one. The
courts have made it pretty clear that where there are alleged constitutional violations, violations which
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would constitute an "irreparable injury," agency actions will ordinarily be held ripe for review and,
moreover, individuals will not be required to exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial
redress.150 However, where the allegations do not concern constitutional violations but, rather, the
reasonableness of the agency decisions per APA section 706, would-be plaintiffs must exhaust their
administrative remedies and the agency action must be final and, therefore, ripe for judicial review.151
What this has to do with remand without vacatur is this: The conclusion reached by courts in
cases like Checkosky is that the agency's decision may be supported by substantial evidence but, then
again, it may not be. The question is an open one and thus the agency must continue with its process to
forge a rationale that the court can in fact review. Insofar as the agency rationale is part of the agency
decision--which it must be, if 706 reasonableness review is to make any sense--the conclusion that the
agency has not yet done enough to justify the court engaging in the process of judicial review is not
different in kind from the conclusion that the agency decision is not yet final and, therefore, the case is
not yet ripe. Ripeness doctrine, fairly applied, would seem to be at odds with the D.C. Circuit's stated
rationale for remanding without vacatur.
If the preceding discussion strikes the reader as a caricature of a technical administrative law
doctrine, this is a fair reading; I intend it as such. It is implausible that ripeness doctrine would stand in
the way of reviewing an agency order as in Checkosky. The agency order is final at the point at which
the SEC applies Rule 2(e) to petitioners Aldrich and Checkosky. In the course of review, the court
sends the case back to the agency because the agency has not finished, but this does not mean that the
order examined by the court was not final for the purposes of the court's initial review.152 The point of
this discussion is to dismantle the formalistic, and strained, justification offered by Judge Silberman in
the Checkosky opinion. He argues that the court is not really engaging in searching review of the agency
decision; remand without vacatur, by this light, embraces agency discretion. However, to get to this
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See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). For a general statement of the law
regarding review of nonfinal agency action, see Judge Leventhal's concurring opinion in Ass'n of
National Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC: "[A] federal court ... [is to] take jurisdiction before agency action ...
only ... in a case of 'clear right' such as outright violation of a clear statutory provision ... or violation of
basic rights established by a structural flaw, and not requiring in any way a consideration of interrelated
aspects of the merits ...." 627 F.2d 1151, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (internal citations omitted).
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See, e.g., Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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This does not mean, however, that the ripeness argument would be frivolous. In
Appalachian Power v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the court noted that:
Of course, an agency's action is not necessarily final merely because it is binding .... In
the administrative setting, "two conditions must be satisfied for agency to be 'final': First,
the action must mark the 'consummation' of the agency's decisionmaking process ... And
second, the action must be one by which 'rights or obligations have been determined,' or
from which 'legal consequences will flow."'
Id. at 1022 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997)). Given what
the Checkosky court ultimately said about the ambiguity in the agency's decision, the agency may have
plausibly (though I do not think, in the end, persuasively) believed that the case was not yet ripe for
review.
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point the court had to (1) take jurisdiction over this case, (2) require the agency to defend its actions in
the federal appellate court, and (3) examine not only the briefs of the party, but also the record in the
case. This constitutes active judicial review, though acknowledging that this activism is tempered by the
decision of the court to send the case back to the agency for further process. Ripeness doctrine would
not permit the court to withhold judicial review, not so long as the agency regulation remains in place.
Thus, the court's searching review was rendered inevitable once it had made the decision to review this
case under section 702 of the APA.
Truly, the only way out of the "inevitable" judicial scrutiny, a scrutiny which leaves to agencies
the heavy responsibility to defend its actions thoroughly in court and, also, to calculate the risk and
costs of intrusive litigation in determining whether and how to fashion its regulatory strategies, is to hold
the agency action unreviewable. This choice is not made in a vacuum; the APA provides twin
categories of situations in which an agency decision is unreviewable. The first category, per section
701(a)(1) of the APA, is where "statutes preclude judicial review."153 The criteria for determining
whether and to what extent review is precluded by statute have been shaped by decades worth of
administrative law cases, each involving specific instances of statutory interpretation. The landscape has
been shaped significantly, if still ambiguously, by the creation in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner of
the presumption of reviewability.154 Given this presumption, and the "clear and convincing evidence"
requirement for overcoming this presumption, it is rare to find review precluded by statute.
It is rare as well for review to be unavailable as a result of the second category in section 701.
This section holds unreviewable agency decisions that are "committed to agency discretion by law."155
The definition of what constitutes "discretionary" agency decisions is, to put it mildly, inexact. We noted
in passing in Part I of this article Heckler v. Chaney, the case in which the Supreme Court held that the
agencies' choices about how best to exercise its enforcement discretion where there are no statutory
standards pertaining to this discretion are unreviewable decisions.156 But what of other agency
decisions not involving enforcement discretion? The standard criterion for determining whether the
action is or is not reviewable is whether there is "law to apply."157
The principal difficulty in the courts' approach to interpreting section 701(a)(2) is that courts
neglect to view the issue of whether an agency decision is "committed to agency discretion" as a
spectrum rather than a category. Administrative situations in which there is truly no law to apply are
rare. There are only two clear instances since the articulation of this standard in Overton Park in which
the Supreme Court has agreed with the agency that there was no law to apply and hence the agency
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decision is unreviewable;158 and it is fair to say that both these decisions involved rather unusual factual
circumstances.159 A more useful approach to evaluating reviewability is to consider, through a more
functional lens, whether the agency is well-suited to make a regulatory decision without intervention by
the reviewing court under section 706(1)(A) or (E) of the APA. Remember that the agency's decision
will always be subject to review for a constitutional violation. More controversial is whether the court
may always review an agency decision to ensure compliance with the APA or with its underlying
statute. We need not settle these difficult questions here, however. The point is that the courts ought to
consider the question of reviewability in light of the spectrum of agency decisions, ranging from those
that involve policy choices and tradeoffs of the sort that agencies are likely to be better suited at making
than a court to those that involve the type of straightforward statutory construction that courts may
credibly argue are at least as much within the expertise of courts as they are within the expertise of
agencies. Under contemporary administrative law doctrine, these questions are usually settled by courts
employing traditional hard look review strategies under the rubric of section 706. This approach
exacerbates regulatory ossification and distorts regulatory policy; moreover, it reinforces the flawed
notion that the measure of good agency reasoning is how skilled government lawyers are in persuading
a reviewing court removed from the agency decisionmaking process that this reasoning is sound and
that the relevant factors have been considered, the proper tradeoffs have been made, etc. Without
denying that there are many circumstances in which such searching judicial review will be not only
desirable, but obligatory, the development of a sensible, practically focused approach to determining
which types of agency decisions are discretionary and, therefore, unreviewable, would represent an
improvement in judicial review of agency decisionmaking.
We turn now to the question of what features of modern judicial decisionmaking impede the
development of this refined approach to functional distribution of court/agency responsibilities. To say
that the APA stands in the way is circular. The APA provides for a structure of judicial review, to be
sure; it grants a right to review and also provides the criteria, in section 706, for the implementation of
that review. However, it also sets out threshold prerequisites for the court to meet in order to proceed
to the review function. The central question is how the APA ought properly to be interpreted and
applied. So, the main issue is not the supposed impediment of the APA, but the incentives, motivations,
and behavior of the appellate courts. After all, it is these courts that are carrying out the twin tasks of
defining the rules governing the review of agency decisions and, further, doing the actual review.
The availability and utility of appropriate judicial remedies is, without doubt, a factor in the
courts' pursuance of particular strategies of judicial review. For instance, the restrictions on standing in
the APA (constitutionally based, the Supreme Court has indicated) limits significantly the ability of
courts to use the vehicle of any case that manages its way up to the appellate case to implement broad
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policy;160 on the other hand, the willingness of the courts to permit broad organizational standing,161
not to mention the availability of citizen suits in key regulatory statutes,162 tempers the impact of standing
limitations and empowers the court to intervene in major policy disputes. Despite what has been
characterized as strict standing doctrine, there is seldom a policy area in which the court is unable to
intervene because of the lack of a suitable case for review. Similarly, the availability of pre-enforcement
review of agency regulations,163 though controversial,164 affects judicial strategies by giving the court the
opportunity to view an agency's policy choice "from the mountain top" rather than from the vantage
point of a particular application of a regulation to a real person. The choice between telescopic and
microscopic review is no doubt a significant one. The fact that the APA provides for pre-enforcement
review, and thus gives the courts this choice, is significant in shaping the role of the courts and therefore
in shaping modern regulatory policymaking.
These rules reflect deliberate choices made by Congress in creating the regime of regulatory
review by courts. An even more interesting cluster of rules are those designed by the courts themselves.
Consistent with the tradition of broad remedial discretion, courts have crafted over the years various
equitable devices to implement their goals and objectives. This is true, as well, in administrative law.
Modern administrative law doctrine is filled with cases considering the scope and reach of judge-made
devices to aid them in carrying out their review functions. It is only a surmise, and one based on
impression rather than on empirical evidence, but I believe that most of these remedial devices have
been designed and deployed in order to expand the role of courts in superintending administrative
agencies. There are counter-examples to be sure. Mootness, ripeness, exhaustion, and sovereign
immunity are four major doctrines, for the most part developed by courts that have the purpose and
effect of narrowing the availability and scope of judicial review. Most other remedial devices in
administrative law, though, cut the other way.165
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Remand without vacatur cuts both ways. From the existing baseline of hard look review, it is a
tempering device; as explained by the D.C. Circuit and by influential commentators, it preserves more
agency discretion and flexibility than the blunt tool of simple vacatur.166 However, it is precisely the
baseline that is in question. If the federal appellate courts were more concerned with limiting the
availability of judicial review overall and, by implication then, the impact of hard look review on agency
performance, then the remand without vacatur device would hardly be necessary. After all, the small
number of cases that would emerge in the appellate courts would be those in which the reviewing court
would be expected to review very closely. If we take seriously the idea of path dependence, basically
the notion that this smaller population of cases would be more likely to reflect agency decisions about
which there is controversy and also agency decisions that are properly subject to searching judicial
scrutiny because courts have substantial expertise in evaluating the agency choice, then we would
expect to see more agency failures. Moreover, these failures would be harder to correct; if that is right,
vacatur would seem to be a more appropriate remedy.
This is a prospective state of the world. What about the real world? Under the current system,
the availability of the remand without vacatur device gives the reviewing courts another reason to
engage in searching judicial review. Since this review is tempered by a less-intrusive remedy, the courts
feel more liberated to engage in some sort of review at all. The result of this review is, for the reasons
already explained here and elsewhere, to burden administrative agencies.167 In the long run, these
burdens shape in damaging ways regulatory policymaking; they contribute to the "ossification" of the
regulatory process.
The fundamental flaw in the remand without vacatur device is that it creates a remedy that
presupposes an activist level of judicial review. It exists against a particular baseline of judicial review.
Even more problematically, it reinforces this baseline by encouraging the courts to review agency
decisions and offer a remedial middle-ground where the agency may be better off with a ground not in
the middle, but closer to their preferred place, a place where the agency decision is discretionary and,
therefore, not reviewable at all.
III. CONCLUSION
Remand without vacatur is a good example of the appellate courts' strategic use of a device in
order to temper the impact of a negative review of agency performance. It provides the agency with a
second bite at the apple. The underlying assumption on the part of the court is that the agency will
succeed at fixing the problem at issue and will therefore succeed when its rule comes before the court
later. There are some reasons to believe that this optimism is warranted; after all, the reviewing court
has typically given the agency a roadmap to follow in reconfiguring its regulatory rationale.
This device is appealing precisely because it acknowledges the difficult role agencies face in
making rules and issuing orders. Carefully exercised, in accordance with guiding principles and attention
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to statutory requirements,168 remand without vacatur gives the reviewing court a useful option that it
would otherwise lack. It is a tempting middle ground between two extremes.
The problem with the device is that it encourages more judicial activism. It is hardly a gift horse
at all, but, instead, more of a Trojan horse. Courts may be too quick on the trigger in pursuing judicial
review in cases where agency expertise should win out, given their belief that remand without vacatur,
along with other tempering devices, will ease the pain of judicial scrutiny. Expanding the scope of
judicial review raises a number of problems.169 Remand without vacatur, I hasten to add, is not the
precipitating cause of hard look review; rather, the relentless impact of hard look review steers the
courts toward developing methods and mechanisms to ameliorate some of the dramatic effects of
interventionist strategies.
The discussion of this one device raises the larger question of how we ought to view the
relationship between the courts' remedial discretion in administrative law cases and the doctrines
concerning scope of review. In much of the case law, as well as the scholarly commentary, these issues
are considered mostly separately. Broad remedial discretion is accepted by and large as an ordinary,
ubiquitous part of the administrative state. And it ought to be so regarded. Administrative law as a body
of law, after all, grows out of what are essentially equitable principles.170 Indeed, before there was an
APA, courts maintained substantial powers to review the conduct and activities of regulatory agencies.
However, in a world in which courts construe their review powers broadly and in which the incentives
to restrain themselves in order to protect the prerogatives of administrative agencies are slim,171 careful
attention must be paid by courts and commentators to the ways courts articulate and apply their
remedial powers.
As with other areas of law, we can tell a lot about the configuration of legal rules and legal
policy in the administrative state by looking carefully at the structure of judicial remedies. When we look
at the remedies developed over the years in which hard look review has been in operation, we see that
the courts are struggling to balance interventionism with deference. Just as there is a certain ambivalence
in their willingness to scrutinize aggressively agency performance, there is ambivalence, as well, in how
they design their remedies. However tempting it may be to embrace this ambivalence and take on face
value the willingness of courts to split the difference, with hard look review maintained alongside
deferential remedy rules, it is more sensible to look at the contours of judicial strategies and the effects
168
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of judicial review from a broader perspective. From this perspective, we can view remand without
vacatur as a risky endeavor. True, it can be deployed to protect agencies from the sword of Damocles;
but it can also fuel the courts' aggressiveness and thereby give effect to some of the worst tendencies in
the super hard look review strategy manifest in contemporary administrative law. We would do well to
consider the bigger picture in evaluating this particular device and, more generally, in assessing the
shape of modern administrative law remedies.
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